[1]黄砺.基础性制度约束与农地产权改革争论:基于制度分层的研究视角[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2016,16(03):90-100.
 HUANG Li.Controversy Between Fundamental Institutional Constraint and Reformation of Farmland Property Rights: From the Perspective of Hierarchical Institution[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2016,16(03):90-100.
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基础性制度约束与农地产权改革争论:基于制度分层的研究视角()
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南京农业大学学报(社科版)[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
16
期数:
2016年03期
页码:
90-100
栏目:
土地问题
出版日期:
2016-04-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Controversy Between Fundamental Institutional Constraint and Reformation of Farmland Property Rights: From the Perspective of Hierarchical Institution
作者:
黄砺
浙江大学 公共管理学院, 浙江 杭州 310058
Author(s):
HUANG Li
关键词:
基础性制度农地产权制度分层改革争议
分类号:
F301.1
摘要:
2013年末,国内知名经济学家华生和周其仁之间就农地产权改革问题进行了议题广泛而又见解深刻的学术争鸣。为了能够在理论层面上解读华生和周其仁之间的这场农地产权改革之争,本文对制度的生成演化问题、制度的分层问题、制度环境与基础性制度、治理结构与产权安排等重要的基础理论问题进行细致的文献回顾,并得出若干基本研究结论:第一,制度环境是"自发秩序"与"设计秩序"的结合;第二,治理结构是在制度环境约束下形成的博弈规则,考虑到物权与产权的分离,农地产权应当被定义在治理结构层次上;第三,我国当前的制度环境已在事实上构成了对农地产权安排的严格约束,从某种程度上来说,我国现阶段的农地产权安排是制度环境的直接产物。如果制度设计者希望全面推进农地产权改革,不应只就农地产权来谈改革,而应将农地产权改革与基础性制度建设有机地联系起来。
Abstract:
At the end of 2013, the domestic well-known economists Hua Sheng and Zhou Qiren conducted a series of academic debates on extensive topics and offered profound opinions, in terms of reformation of the farmland property rights. In order to better interpret the controversy over farmland property rights reformation between Hua Sheng and Zhou Qiren, this paper makes a detailed literature review on the generation and evolution of system, the hierarchical problem of system, system environment and fundamental system, governance structure and property arrangement, and then draws several basic research conclusions: Firstly, the institutional environment(composed of legal institutions, political institutions, etc) is a combination of ‘spontaneous order’ and ‘designed order’. Secondly, the governance structure is a game rule formed under the restraint of institutional environment. Considering the separation of real right and property right, the farmland property(unification of farmland residual claim and farmland residual control right) should be redefined at the level of governance structure. Thirdly, the current institutional environment in China(such as the law system and political system) has actually formed strict restraints over the arrangement of farmland property. To a certain extent, the current farmland property arrangement in China is a direct product of institutional environment. If the designer of institution hopes to fully promote the reformation of farmland property, he should not talk about the reform in view of the farmland property, but organically associate the farmland property reformation with the construction of fundamental institutions.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2015-10-13。
作者简介:黄砺,男,浙江大学公共管理学院土地资源管理系博士生。E-mail:hl6662006@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01