[1]蔡起华,朱玉春.关系网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的影响——以农户参与小型农田水利建设投资为例[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2017,17(01):108-118.
　CAI Qihua,ZHU Yuchun.The Influence of Relational Networks on Farmers’ Participation in Village Collective Action: Based on Farmers’ Participation in the Investment of Small Irrigation System[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2017,17(01):108-118.
点击复制

关系网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的影响——以农户参与小型农田水利建设投资为例()
分享到：

南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
17
期数:
2017年01期
页码:
108-118
栏目:
农业经济
出版日期:
2016-12-22

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Influence of Relational Networks on Farmers’ Participation in Village Collective Action: Based on Farmers’ Participation in the Investment of Small Irrigation System
作者:
蔡起华;  朱玉春
西北农林科技大学 经济管理学院, 陕西 杨凌 712100
Author(s):
CAI Qihua;  ZHU Yuchun
关键词:
关系网络; 农户参与; 村庄集体行动; 影响效应; Heckman样本选择模型
分类号:
F303.1
摘要:
厘清农户参与村庄集体行动的逻辑，对农村公共事务治理效果的提升有重要的理论及实践意义。基于宁夏、陕西和河南三个省份1440户农户入户调查数据，利用Heckman样本选择模型，以农户参与小型农田水利建设投资为例，实证分析关系网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的影响效应。研究表明，农户选择参与村庄集体行动的比例较低，但大多数农户参与村庄集体行动的程度较高。关系网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的意愿及程度均有显著正影响，在细分维度变量中，弱连接网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的意愿及程度均有显著正影响，而强连接网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的意愿有显著正影响，对农户参与村庄集体行动的程度有正影响，但不显著。进一步边际效应分析表明，关系网络对农户参与村庄集体行动的意愿及程度提升的边际效应都比较显著，在农户参与意愿提升方面，强连接网络边际效应略大于弱连接网络，而在农户参与程度提升方面，弱连接网络边际效应远大于强连接网络。
Abstract:
Clarifying the logic of farmers’ participation in the village collective action has important theoretical and practical significance to enhancing the effect of rural public affairs governance. Based on farmers’ participation in the investment of small irrigation system and using a sample of 1 440 household data in the three provinces of Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Henan in rural China, this paper used Heckman sample selection model to analyze the effect of relational networks on farmers’ participation in village collective action. The results showed that, the choice of farmers’ participation in village collective action has a low level, but the degree of farmers’ participation in village collective action has a high level. Relational networks have significant positive influence on both willingness and degree of farmers’ participation in village collective action. In the segmentation dimensions, weak ties have significant positive influence on both willingness and degree of farmers’ participation in village collective action, and strong ties have significant positive influence on the willingness of farmers’ participation in village collective action, but have insignificant positive influence on the degree of farmers’ participation in village collective action. The marginal effect showed that, the marginal effect of relational networks is obvious, and in enhancing the willingness of farmers’ participation in village collective action, the marginal effect of strong ties is bigger than the marginal effect of weak ties, but in enhancing the degree of farmers’ participation in village collective action, the marginal effect of weak ties is much bigger than the marginal effect of strong ties.

参考文献/References:

[1] 王亚华, 高瑞, 孟庆国. 中国农村公共事务治理的危机与响应[J]. 清华大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2016(2):23-29.
[2] 汪锦军. 农村公共事务治理:寻求政府主导与农民主体的平衡[J]. 行政论坛, 2009(1):22-24.
[3] 冷志明. 公共事务治理百年研究历程[J]. 经济学动态, 2011(6):108-114.
[4] 高瑞, 王亚华, 陈春良. 劳动力外流与农村公共事务治理[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2016(2):84-92.
[5] 蔡起华, 朱玉春. 农户参与农村公共产品供给意愿分析[J]. 华南农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2014(3):45-51.
[6] 蔡起华, 朱玉春. 社会信任、收入水平与农村公共产品农户参与供给[J]. 南京农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2015(1):41-50.
[7] Putnam R D, Leonardi R, Nanetti R. Making Democracy Work:Civic Traditions in Modern Italy[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1993.
[8] Lin N. Social capital:A Theory of Social Structure and Action[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[9] Scott J. Social Network Analysis[M]. Third edition. Los Angeles:SAGE, 2013.
[10] Munshi K, Rosenzweig M. Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth[R].National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.
[11] Kinnan C, Townsend R. Kinship and Financial Networks, Formal Financial Access, and Risk Reduction[J]. The American Economic Review, 2012,102(3):289-293.
[12] 章元, 陆铭. 社会网络是否有助于提高农民工的工资水平?[J]. 管理世界, 2009(3):45-54.
[13] 唐为, 陆云航. 社会资本影响农民收入水平吗——基于关系网络、信任与和谐视角的实证分析[J]. 经济学家, 2011(9):77-85.
[14] 杨汝岱, 陈斌开, 朱诗娥. 基于社会网络视角的农户民间借贷需求行为研究[J]. 经济研究, 2011(11):116-129.
[15] 卫龙宝, 凌玲, 阮建青. 村庄特征对村民参与农村公共产品供给的影响研究——基于集体行动理论[J]. 农业经济问题, 2011(5):48-53.
[16] 刘辉, 陈思羽. 农户参与小型农田水利建设意愿影响因素的实证分析——基于对湖南省粮食主产区475户农户的调查[J]. 中国农村观察, 2012(2):54-66.
[17] 王昕, 陆迁. 农村社区小型水利设施合作供给意愿的实证[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2012(6):115-119.
[18] 李冰冰, 王曙光. 社会资本、乡村公共品供给与乡村治理——基于10省17村农户调查[J]. 经济科学, 2013(3):61-71.
[19] 蔡荣,蔡书凯. 村庄规模、收入不均等性与村庄集体行动——以安徽省102个村庄的农田灌溉设施建设为例[J]. 经济评论, 2014(1):48-57.
[20] 蔡起华,朱玉春. 社会信任、关系网络与农户参与农村公共产品供给[J]. 中国农村经济, 2015(7):57-69.
[21] 魏柔云, 朱玉春. 关系网络与农户参与公共产品供给意愿[J]. 北方园艺, 2015(1):199-202.
[22] Cai Q, Zhu Y, Chen Q. Can Social Networks Increase Households’ Contribution to Public-good Provision in Rural China? The Case of Small Hydraulic Facilities Construction[J]. China Agricultural Economic Review, 2016,8(1):148-169.
[23] Granovetter M. Economic Action and Social Structure:The Problem of Embeddedness[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1985:481-510.
[24] Bian Y. Bringing Strong Ties Back in:Indirect Ties, Network Bridges, and Job Searches in China[J]. American Sociological Review, 1997:366-385.
[25] 崔宝玉, 张忠根. 农村公共产品农户供给行为的影响因素分析——基于嵌入性社会结构的理论分析框架[J]. 南京农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2009(1):25-31.
[26] Ostrom E. Analyzing Collective Action[J]. Agricultural Economics, 2010,41:155-166.
[27] Ostrom E, Ahn T K. The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective Action[J]. Social Science Electionic Publishing, 2007.
[28] Granovetter M. The Strength of Weak Ties[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1973:1360-1380.
[29] Siegel D A. Social Networks and Collective Action[J]. American Journal of Political Science, 2009,53(1):122-138.
[30] Uzzi B. Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks:The Paradox of Embeddedness[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997,42(1):35-67.
[31] Christakis N A, Fowler J H. Connected:The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape our Lives[M]. New York:Little, Brown and Co., 2009.
[32] Heckman J J. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error[J]. Econometrica, 1979,47(1):153-161.
[33] Greene W H. Econometric Analysis[M]. 7th. Boston:Prentice Hall, 2012.
[34] Wooldridge J M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data[M]. 2nd. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 2010.
[35] Wooldridge J M. Introductory Econometrics:A Modern Approach[M]. 5th. Mason, OH:South-Western Cengage Learning, 2013.
[36] Knight J, Yueh L. The Role of Social Capital in The Labour Market in China[J]. Economics of Transition, 2008,16(3):389-414.
[37] Liu M M. Migrant Networks and International Migration:Testing Weak Ties[J]. Demography, 2013,50(4):1243-1277.
[38] 寇恩惠, 刘柏惠. 公私部门工资差距——基于扩展的Heckman选择模型[J]. 数量经济技术经济研究, 2011(3):66-78.
[39] Ostrom E. Governing The Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M]. Cambridge, New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[40] 刘斌, 李磊. 寻职中的社交网络"强连接""弱连接"与劳动者工资水平[J]. 管理世界, 2012(8):115-128.

相似文献/References:

[1]蔡起华,朱玉春.社会信任、收入水平与农村公共产品农户参与供给[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2015,15(01):41.
[2]蔡起华,朱玉春.社会信任、收入水平与农村公共产品农户参与供给[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2015,15(01):0.
　[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2015,15(01):0.
[3]蔡起华,朱玉春.社会信任、收入水平与农村公共产品农户参与供给[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2015,15(01):0.
　[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2015,15(01):0.
[4]张益丰.生鲜果品电商销售、农户参与意愿及合作社嵌入--来自烟台大樱桃产区农户的调研数据[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2016,16(01):49.
　ZHANG Yifeng.On E-Commerce of Fresh Fruit, Cooperative Embedding and the Willingness of Farmers to Participate: Empirical Analysis of Field Survey Data of 241 Fruit Farmers in Yantai Large Cherry Planting Field[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2016,16(01):49.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2016-09-27。
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“基于农户收入差异视角的农田水利设施供给效果及改进路径研究”（71273210）；教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划“合作信任、关系网络与小型农田水利农户参与供给研究”（NCET-13-0492）；陕西高校人文社会科学青年英才支持计划“小型农田水利农户参与供给研究：合作信任、社会网络视角”（陕教高2015（16）号）
作者简介:蔡起华,男,西北农林科技大学经济管理学院博士生,E-mail:caiqihua2007@163.com;朱玉春,女,西北农林科技大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01