[1]黄惠春,范文静.政府功能视角下“政银担”贷款模式的运行机制——以山东和安徽为例[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2019,19(02):131-141.
　HUANG Huichun,FAN Wenjing.Government Function and “Government-bank-guarantee” Loan Mode: A Case Study of Shandong and Anhui Provinces[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2019,19(02):131-141.
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政府功能视角下“政银担”贷款模式的运行机制——以山东和安徽为例()
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南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
19
期数:
2019年02期
页码:
131-141
栏目:
农业经济
出版日期:
2019-03-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Government Function and “Government-bank-guarantee” Loan Mode: A Case Study of Shandong and Anhui Provinces
作者:
黄惠春;  范文静
南京农业大学 金融学院, 江苏 南京 210095
Author(s):
HUANG Huichun;  FAN Wenjing
关键词:
“政银担”; 农业担保贷款; 政府功能
Keywords:
“government-bank-guarantee” loan mode; agricultural credit; government function
分类号:
F830.58
摘要:
本文以山东济南和安徽宿州试点为典型案例，分析比较了两地"政银担"农业信用担保贷款模式的运行机制，总结归纳了政府在其中的职责与功能。研究表明：政府参与可以弥补农村信贷市场缺陷，降低贷款成本并提高贷款可获性；两地试点在风险分担方式、准入门槛以及政府服务深度等方面存在差异；三方协调度低、风险再分担机制缺失、隐性贷款门槛较高等问题抑制了试点的预期效果。因此，在试点推进过程中，地方政府应通过构建协调监督与风险再分担机制进一步完善"政银担"模式，以提高农业信贷供给，促进农民增收。
Abstract:
Based on the typical cases of Jinan in Shandong Province and Suzhou in Anhui Province, this paper compares and analyzes the operation mechanism and government function of the "government-bank-guarantee" agricultural guarantee loan mode in the two experimental areas. The results show that government participation can make up for the defects of rural credit market, reduce the loan cost and increase the credit availability. There are many differences between experimental loan mode in the way of risk sharing, the threshold of loan access and the depth of government service. Because of the low tripartite coordination, lacking of risk re-sharing mechanism and the potential loan threshold, the experiments are not as effective as expected. Therefore, the local government should further improve the loan mode by constructing the supervision and risk re-sharing mechanism to increase the supply of agricultural credit and promote the farmers’ income.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2017-12-1。
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目"农村土地承包经营权抵押、农户异质性与信贷约束缓解"（71473124）；国家自然科学基金项目"农业经营体系创新视角下抵押替代合约演进与融资效率研究"（71873066）
作者简介:黄惠春,女,南京农业大学金融学院教授,博士生导师。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01