[1]仝志辉.分利型村治中的贿选与村级权力正当性——基于L村选举史的讨论[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2016,16(03):1-14.
　TONG Zhihui.Discussion on Bribery-Election in Interest-Share-Type Village Governance and Village Power legitimacy: Based on Election History of X Village[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2016,16(03):1-14.
点击复制

分利型村治中的贿选与村级权力正当性——基于L村选举史的讨论()
分享到：

南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
16
期数:
2016年03期
页码:
1-14
栏目:
农村社会发展
出版日期:
2016-04-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Discussion on Bribery-Election in Interest-Share-Type Village Governance and Village Power legitimacy: Based on Election History of X Village
作者:
仝志辉
中国人民大学 农业与农村发展学院, 北京 100872
Author(s):
TONG Zhihui
关键词:
贿选; 分利型村治; 土地派系; 村级权力正当性; 乡村治理
分类号:
C912.82
摘要:
文章通过一个村庄的选举史叙述,解析了竞争性选举和土地派系、分利型村治形成的复杂关系,并在村庄治理背景下展现了贿选的成因和多重治理功能,从而形成对竞争性选举制度与村庄权力正当性的多维度理解。研究表明:土地派系存在和形成于村级治理过程之中,构成村庄分利秩序的基础性结构;分利型村治在竞争性选举中强化并逐步和选举互相依赖,但选举本身并未能提高村级权力的正当性;贿选强化分利型村治,增强了其公平性,一定程度上提高了村级权力正当性;竞争性选举与村级权力正当性之间的关系复杂。文章意在挑战民主选举提升村庄权力正当性的既有理解,并借以重新开启村级权力产生途径的探讨。
Abstract:
Based on the history of village election, the present paper analyzed the complicated relationship involving competitive election and farm-land factions and interest-share-type village governance, and elaborated on the causes of bribery election and multi-administration function in the background of village governance, so that the multi-dimensional understanding of competitive election and village power legitimacy is formed. The study showed that the rise of farm-land factions and their existence in the process of village governance gave rise to the basic structure of village-interest-share order. Interest-share-type village governance was enhanced and gradually formed a mutual inter-dependent relationship with elections in the competitive election, but the election itself never upgraded the legitimacy of village powers. Bribery-election strengthened the interest-share-type village governance, promoted its fairness and raised the village power legitimacy to a higher level to some extent. Hence, the relationship between competitive election and village power legitimacy is complicated. The present paper aimed at challenging the existing conception on democratic election’s promotion of village power legitimacy, and thereby resurrecting the discussion on village power generation paths.

参考文献/References:

[1] 仝志辉,贺雪峰. 村庄权力结构的三层分析——兼论选举后村级权力的合法性[J].中国社会科学,2002(1).
[2] 董江爱,崔培兵. 村治中的政治博弈与利益整合——资源型农村选举纠纷的博弈分析[J].中国农村观察,2010(2).
[3] 贺雪峰.论利益密集型农村地区的治理——以河南周口市郊农村调研为讨论基础[J].政治学研究,2011(2).
[4] 耿宇.低水平均衡的土地分利秩序——论土地开发与村庄政治[J].中国农业大学学报:社会科学版,2014(3).
[5] 孙琼欢,卢福营.中国农村基层政治生活中的派系竞争[J].中国农村观察,2000(3).
[6] 孙琼欢.村委会选举中派系竞争策略——以浙江省T村村委会选举为例[J].学习与探索,2009(2).
[7] 吴思红.村庄派系与村级权力结构的稳定性[J].华中科技大学学报:社会科学版,2009(2).
[8] 吴思红.村委会选举中贿选的社会基础与治理机制[J].经济社会体制比较,2009(3).
[9] 王海娟,贺雪峰.资源下乡与分利秩序[J].学习与探索,2015(2).

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2015-10-27。
作者简介:仝志辉,男,中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院副教授。E-mail:tongzhihui@163.com
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01