[1]原贺贺.贫困村识别的基层政府治理理性解构——以中原M县为例[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2019,19(03):18-28.
　YUAN Hehe.The Rational Deconstruction of Grass-Roots Government Governance Identified by Poverty Village Identification: A Case Study Based on M County in the Central Regions[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2019,19(03):18-28.
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贫困村识别的基层政府治理理性解构——以中原M县为例()
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南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
19
期数:
2019年03期
页码:
18-28
栏目:
精准扶贫理论与实践
出版日期:
2019-05-17

文章信息/Info

Title:
The Rational Deconstruction of Grass-Roots Government Governance Identified by Poverty Village Identification: A Case Study Based on M County in the Central Regions
作者:
原贺贺
华中师范大学 公共管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430079
Author(s):
YUAN Hehe
关键词:
精准扶贫; 贫困村识别; 基层政府治理理性; 科层理性; 关系理性
Keywords:
Precision Poverty Alleviation; Poverty Village Identification; Grass-Roots Governance Rationality; Hierarchical Rationality; Relational Rationality
分类号:
C930
摘要:
精准脱贫是全面建成小康社会的重要抓手，精准识别是精准脱贫的基础，贫困村识别是精准识别的重要内容。以科层理性和关系理性为分析工具，解构中原M县贫困村识别的基层政府治理理性。科层理性从识别条件、指标规模和申报程序三个方面规制基层政府（县级政府和乡镇政府）的关系理性。关系理性对科层理性的消解，造成基层政府贫困村识别偏差：县扶贫办将指标向"特色工程"倾斜，于乡镇间"选择性平衡"，优先配置于基础好的乡镇，形成指标分解的初步偏差；乡镇将有高层政治资源关联的、认同乡镇权威的、有利于组织平衡的、忠诚度高的、可规避风险的、可凸显政绩的村庄纳入贫困村，最终造成55%的偏差率。综上，基层政府治理理性的逻辑序列为：科层理性优先于关系理性；在价值型关系理性中，面向上的价值型关系理性优先于面向下的价值型关系理性；在工具型关系理性中，"规避风险"优先于"政绩"；价值型关系理性优先于工具型关系理性之"政绩"维度；同一治理主体在不同政策阶段遵循不同的治理理性。
Abstract:
Targeted poverty alleviation is an important starting point for building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects. Accurate identification is the basis of accurate poverty alleviation, and the identification of poor villages is an important part of accurate identification. With hierarchy rationality and relationship rationality as analytical tools, this paper deconstructs the governance rationality of grass-roots government identified by poor villages of M County in the Central Regions. Stratification rationality regulates the relationship rationality of grassroots government (county-level government and township government) from three aspects of identification condition, index scale and declaration procedure. The dispelling of the relationship rationality to the stratification rationality causes the identification deviation of the poverty-stricken village by the grassroot government. The county poverty relief office tends to direct the index to the "characteristic work" and "selective balance" among towns and villages, and gives priority to those towns and villages with good foundation, forming the initial deviation of index decomposition. Villages associated with high-level political resources, identifying with the authority of towns and villages, being conducive to organizational balance, having high loyalty, being able to avoid risks, and highlighting their political achievements will be included in the poor village sequence, eventually resulting in a deviation rate of 55%. To sum up, the rational logic sequence of grass-roots government governance is as follows:Hierarchical reason takes precedence over relational reason. In the value relational rationality, the up-oriented value relational rationality takes precedence over the down-oriented value relational rationality. In instrumental relationship rationality, "risk aversion" takes precedence over "achievement".

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2018-05-31。
基金项目:清华大学农村研究院清华农村研究博士论文奖学金项目"产业扶贫政策过程中贫困户话语权问题研究——基于后现代公共行政话语理论视角"（201708）；2017年华中师范大学优秀博士学位论文培育计划资助项目"博弈论视角下产业扶贫政策过程的基层逻辑解构"（2017YBZZ011）
作者简介:原贺贺,女,华中师范大学公共管理学院博士生。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01