[1]刘馨月,周力.订单农业契约属性安排:农户风险态度与契约选择决策[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2020,20(02):140-148.
　LIU Xinyue,ZHOU Li.Agricultural Contract Arrangement: Farmers’ Risk Attitude and Contract Choice Decision[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2020,20(02):140-148.
点击复制

订单农业契约属性安排:农户风险态度与契约选择决策()
分享到：

南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
20
期数:
2020年02期
页码:
140-148
栏目:
农业经济
出版日期:
2020-04-01

文章信息/Info

Title:
Agricultural Contract Arrangement: Farmers’ Risk Attitude and Contract Choice Decision
作者:
刘馨月;  周力
南京农业大学 经济管理学院, 江苏 南京 210095
Author(s):
LIU Xinyue;  ZHOU Li
关键词:
风险态度; 契约属性; 契约选择; 实验经济
Keywords:
Risk Attitude; Contract Attribute; Contract Choice; Experimental Economic
分类号:
F325.1
摘要:
订单农业在帮助签约户分担风险方面发挥着重要作用,本文在一个较为完整的分析框架下同时考虑了农业生产面临的多种风险,探讨风险态度异质性农户对具有不同类风险分担能力的契约属性偏好。利用江苏省11市368个养鸡户的风险偏好实验和契约属性选择实验数据进行实证检验,从农户层面揭示了订单农业在帮助小农户应对生产、价格以及交易不确定性风险的相对重要性。研究表明：（1）由于固定价格条款在分担价格风险和防范企业隐性违约等方面具有明显优势,农户偏好程度高；（2）风险态度异质性在规模户中表现较为明显,随着损失厌恶程度相应提高,规模户对规避生产风险的契约属性偏好程度提高；（3）规模户和小户预期通过契约规避的风险类型存在差异,规模户对规避各类风险的契约属性关注度都较高,而小户主要关注规避价格风险的契约属性。因此在禽流感、非洲猪瘟等疫情频发的背景下,政府应鼓励和引导龙头企业优化契约设计,切实保障签约农户利益以提高契约参与率。
Abstract:
Contract farming plays an important role in helping contracting households to share risks. In this paper, under a relatively complete analytical framework, we consider various risks faced by agricultural production, and discuss the preference of farmers with heterogeneous risk attitudes towards different types of contract attributes with different risk sharing capacity. The experimental data of risk preference and contract attribute selection of 368 chicken farmers in 11 cities of Jiangsu Province are used for empirical testing. The purpose of this paper is to reveal the relative importance of contract farming in helping smallholders cope with the risks of production, price and transaction. We try to answer what kind of contract arrangement is conducive to maximizing the utility of farmers and effectively protect the interests of vulnerable farmers. The research shows that farmers prefer fixed price term because it has obvious advantages in sharing price risks and preventing implicit defaults of enterprises. The heterogeneity of risk attitude is obvious in scale households. With the increase of loss aversion, scale households’ preference for contract attributes that help avoid production risk increases. There are differences in the types of risks that scale households and small households expect to avoid through contract. Scale households pay more attention to contract attributes that avoid various risks, while small households mainly focus on contract attributes that avoid price risks. Therefore, under the background of frequent occurrence of major animal diseases such as avian influenza and African swine fever, the government should encourage and guide leading enterprises to optimize the contract design to effectively protect the interests of contracting farmers.

参考文献/References:

[1] 徐家鹏, 李崇光. 蔬菜种植户产销环节紧密纵向协作参与意愿的影响因素分析[J]. 中国农村观察, 2012(4):2-13,92.
[2] 周力, 龙子妍. 市场风险冲击下的契约稳定性分析——基于农业产业化龙头企业隐性违约的视角[J]. 财经研究, 2019, 45(10):112-124.
[3] 刘凤芹. 不完全合约与履约障碍——以订单农业为例[J]. 经济研究, 2003(4):22-30,92.
[4] Schipmann C, Qaim M. Supply Chain Differentiation, Contract Agriculture, and Farmers’ Marketing Preferences: The Case of Sweet Pepper in Thailand[J]. Food Policy, 2011, 36(5):667-677.
[5] Otsuka K, Nakano K Y. Takahashi. Contract Farming in Developed and Developing Countries[J]. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2016, 8(1):353-376.
[6] Abebe G K, Bijman J, Kemp R, et al. Contract Farming Configuration: Smallholders’ Preferences for Contract Design Attributes[J]. Food Policy, 2013, 40: 14-24.
[7] Ochieng D O, Veettil P C, Qaim M. Farmers’ Preferences for Supermarket Contracts in Kenya[J]. Food Policy, 2017, 68: 100-111.
[8] 生秀东. 订单农业的契约困境和组织形式的演进[J]. 中国农村经济, 2007(12):35-39,46.
[9] 万俊毅. 准纵向一体化、关系治理与合约履行——以农业产业化经营的温氏模式为例[J]. 管理世界, 2008(12):93-102,187-188.
[10] 周立群, 邓宏图. 为什么选择了"准一体化"的基地合约——来自塞飞亚公司与农户签约的证据[J]. 中国农村观察, 2004(3):2-11,20,80.
[11] 卢昆, 马九杰. 农户参与订单农业的行为选择与决定因素实证研究[J]. 农业技术经济, 2010(9):10-17.
[12] 蔡荣, 蔡书凯. "公司+农户"模式: 风险转移制度与农户契约选择[J]. 南京农业大学学报(社会科学版), 2013, 13(2):19-25.
[13] 郭红东. 龙头企业与农户订单安排与履约: 理论和来自浙江企业的实证分析[J]. 农业经济问题, 2006(2):36-42,79.
[14] 王亚飞, 黄勇, 唐爽. 龙头企业与农户订单履约效率及其动因探寻——来自91家农业企业的调查资料[J]. 农业经济问题, 2014, 35(11):16-25.
[15] 伏红勇, 但斌. 天气影响产出下"公司+农户"模式的风险补偿协调契约[J]. 管理工程学报, 2015, 29(2):175-181.
[16] 刘馨月, 周力.专用性投资与契约稳定性的再审视——基于外部选择的探讨[J]. 农业技术经济, 2019(8):68-78.
[17] Gelaw F, Speelman S G. Van Huylenbroeck. Farmers’ Marketing Preferences in Local Coffee Markets: Evidence from a Choice Experiment in Ethiopia[J]. Food Policy, 2016, 61: 92-102.
[18] Vassalos M, Flu W Y, Woods T, et al. Risk Preferences, Transaction Costs, and Choice of Marketing Contracts: Evidence from a Choice Experiment with Fresh Vegetable Producers[J]. Agribusiness, 2016, 32(3):379-396.
[19] 朋文欢, 黄祖辉. 契约安排、农户选择偏好及其实证——基于选择实验法的研究[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2017, 47(4):143-158.
[20] Liu E M, Huang J K. Risk Preferences and Pesticide Use by Cotton Farmers in China[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2013, 103: 202-215.
[21] 王宏州, 黄季焜. 农民的风险和共担风险偏好研究[J]. 农业经济问题, 2016, 37(11):86-94,112.
[22] Tanaka T, Camerer C F, Nguyen Q. Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam[J]. American Economic Review, 2010, 100(1):557-571.
[23] Dhar R I. Simonson. The Effect of Forced Choice on Choice[J]. Journat of Marketing Research, 2003: 146-160.
[24] Veldwijk J, Lambooji M S, de Bekker-Grob E W, et al. The Effect of Including an Opt-out Option in Discrete Choice Experiments[J]. Value in Health, 2013, 16(3):1-9.
[25] Fischer S, Wollni M. The Role of Farmers’ Trust, Risk and Time Preferences for Contract Choices: Experimental Evidence from the Ghanaian Pineapple Sector[J]. Food Policy, 2018, 81: 67-81.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2019-07-03。
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目"市场风险冲击下禽业纵向协作的隐性契约稳定性研究"（71573130）
作者简介:刘馨月,女,南京农业大学经济管理学院博士生。
通讯作者:周力(通信作者),男,南京农业大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01