[1]马鹏超,朱玉春.设立村级河长提升农村水环境治理绩效了吗?——基于倾向得分匹配(PSM)的反事实估计[J].南京农业大学学报(社科版),2022,22(01):149-159.
　MA Pengchao,ZHU Yuchun.Did the Establishment of Village-level River Chief Improve the Performance of Rural Water Environment Governance? Based on the Counter-factual Estimation of the Propensity Score Matching(PSM)[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Science),2022,22(01):149-159.
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设立村级河长提升农村水环境治理绩效了吗?——基于倾向得分匹配(PSM)的反事实估计()
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南京农业大学学报（社科版）[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
22
期数:
2022年01期
页码:
149-159
栏目:
农业经济
出版日期:
2022-01-25

文章信息/Info

Title:
Did the Establishment of Village-level River Chief Improve the Performance of Rural Water Environment Governance? Based on the Counter-factual Estimation of the Propensity Score Matching(PSM)
作者:
马鹏超;  朱玉春
西北农林科技大学 经济管理学院, 陕西 杨凌 712100
Author(s):
MA Pengchao;  ZHU Yuchun
关键词:
村级河长; 农村水环境; 生态绩效; 社会绩效; 倾向得分匹配
Keywords:
Village-level River Chief; Rural Water Environment; Ecological Performance; Social Performance; Propensity Score Matching
分类号:
F320.2
摘要:
农村水环境长期存在"边治理、边衰退"和地方政府监管乏力问题，通过广泛设立村级河长能促进农村水环境治理绩效的提升吗？基于黄河流域4省份实地调查数据，采用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）实证检验村级河长的设立对农村水环境治理绩效的影响及机制，比较不同流域差异、地理区位及村庄规模下的组群差异。实证结果表明：村级河长的设立能够显著提升农村水环境治理绩效，对上游村庄、中小型村庄、近郊村的水环境治理绩效有显著的提升效应，且稳健性检验后结论依然成立。进一步的机制分析发现，村级河长有效治理的深层原因在于村庄内部知识资源、关系资源、动员能力发挥着中介效应，在政府纵向激励问责机制的驱动下村级河长通过资源整合与策略化动员，有效弥补自身治水资源不足的缺陷，避开低绩效陷阱，进而提升河长制在"最后一公里"的政策效应。
Abstract:
The rural water environment has a long-standing problem of "deteriorating with governing" and weak local government supervision. Can the extensive establishment of village-level river chiefs promote the improvement of rural water environment governance performance? Based on the field survey data in four provinces in the Yellow River Basin, this paper uses the propensity score matching method (PSM) to empirically test the impact and mechanism of the establishment of village-level river chiefs on the performance of rural water environment governance, and compare different river basins, geographic location and group differences under village size. The empirical results show that the establishment of village-level river chiefs can significantly improve the performance of rural water environment governance, and has a significant effect on the water environment governance performance of upstream villages, small and medium-sized villages, and suburban villages, and even if the treatment group is randomly selected for placebo test after that, the results are still significantly established. Further mechanism analysis finds that the underlying reason for the effective governance of village-level river chiefs lies in the intermediary effect of the village’s internal institutional capacity. Driven by the government’s vertical accountability mechanism, the village-level river chiefs effectively compensate for themselves through resource integration and strategic mobilization, avoid the shortcomings of insufficient water resources management, avoid the trap of low performance, and then further enhance the policy effect of the river length system in the "last mile".

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2021-03-18。
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重点项目"河长制的公众参与与运行机制研究"（18AZD003）
作者简介:马鹏超,男,西北农林科技大学经济管理学院博士生。
通讯作者:朱玉春(通信作者),女,西北农林科技大学经济管理学院教授。
更新日期/Last Update: 1900-01-01